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Abstract
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In any empirical analysis of cross country economic performance it is easy
to ﬁnd a few episodes of fast growth, as well as many instances of economic
stagnation. A major challenge for economic theory is to identify what are the
driving forces behind the successes and failures. Ultimately, the objective
of the theory is to come up with a recipe that a country can use to produce
economic miracles as well as disasters. No amount of atheoretical empirical
work can discover the engines (or the brakes) of growth. Since there are
plenty of theoretical models that can, on paper, produce economic miracles,
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1it is necessary to better understand the implications of each model for how
economic variables respond to exogenous shocks.
In this paper we make a (very) preliminary assessment of the ability of a
version of the neoclassical growth model to explain episodes of fast growth, as
well as instances of economic stagnation. The model that we study features
individuals who are ﬁnitely lived but care about their descendants, albeit in
an imperfect way. There are two capital stocks: physical and human capital.
The key diﬀerence between them is that the latter completely depreciates
when an individual dies. This, in turn, implies that our setup is not a special
case of the inﬁnitely lived version. We follow Lucas’ (1993) suggestion (but
not his model) and allow human capital to have both a quality and a quantity
dimension, and we go beyond the schooling decision and recognize that on-
the-job training is an important component of aggregate human capital.
The human capital accumulation technology that we use is a version of the
Ben-Porath (1967) model, which has the advantage of predicting the shape
of the age earnings proﬁle. This, in turn, allows us to pin down the key
parameters.
We calibrate the model to match (mostly) U.S. data, and then we use the
calibrated model to explore the roles that total factor productivity (TFP)
and demographic shocks have in explaining the stellar economic performance
of several East Asian countries over the last 40 years, as well the as the
relatively poor performance of many Latin American economies.
There is a large literature that has studied both cases. Prescott and
Hayashi (2002) argued that low TFP growth explains Japan’s poor perfor-
mance since the early 1990s. More recently, Chen, Ïmrohoroglu and Ïm-
rohoroglu (2006) ﬁnd that a simple neoclassical model can account for the
large diﬀerences in saving rates between U.S. and Japan. Other studies, e.g.
2Chang and Hornstein (2007) and Papageorgiu and Perez-Sebastian (2005),
reach the opposite conclusion: they claim that models that deviate from the
standard neoclassical model are needed to explain the economic performance
of East Asian countries. In the case of Latin America, DeGregorio (2006)
presents a good summary of the region’s economic performance. Bergoing
et.al (2002) used the neoclassical model to compare the performance of Chile
and Mexico and concluded that the timing and nature of economic reforms
in Chile account for its better performance. Kydland and Zarazaga (2002),
using a similar model, concluded that economic performance in Argentina
was signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by changes in TFP. Cole et. al. (2005) con-
clude that TFP (but not human capital) is the dominant force behind the
economic performance of Latin America.
By construction, the model in this paper is driven by TFP shocks and
(exogenous) demographic shocks. However, the human capital sector plays
a central role in understanding economic growth. Moreover, policies that
aﬀect the allocation of resources in this sector can have a signiﬁcant impact
on output.
For the East Asian countries, we show that the model is consistent with
their stellar economic performance in the sense that it predicts changes in
the average level of schooling of the labor force in line with the evidence.
Moreover, the model is also consistent with the observed increase in the
investment-output ratio. We brieﬂy explore the transitional dynamics in this
case, and we argue that the dynamic responses of schooling and investment
to a one time TFP shock are plausible.
Our ﬁndings for Latin America using the same basic model are not en-
couraging. We ﬁnd that, in general, the model underpredicts schooling in
many countries. Thus, the standard version of the model reproduces the “ex-
3cess education puzzle” for Latin America: signiﬁcant increases in schooling
have not resulted in substantial increases in output. To further understand
the role of resource allocation (across individuals and levels of schooling),
we modify the model along two dimensions: we allow for heterogeneity in
ability and we add a public education system. With this change the “excess
education” puzzle is much smaller for the three countries that we study in
some detail (Argentina, Brazil and Chile). We then introduce an imperfec-
tion in capital markets: individuals are restricted to a non-negative asset
position. In this case the interaction of a suboptimal allocation of resources
in the public sector (even when we allow for a private educational sector)
and the inability of poor individuals to borrow against their future income
makes the prediction of the model consistent with the data. Thus, two
restrictions that distort investment in the human capital sector suﬃce to
“solve” the excess education puzzle. We conduct several experiments that
try to quantify the long run gains of reallocating educational resources, and
we ﬁnd that the potential beneﬁts are large.
In this paper we do not provide a “recipe for growth.” Rather, we view
our results as suggesting the possibilities that the neoclassical model, aug-
mented with a reasonable demographic structure and a realistic technology
for the accumulation of human capital, has to explain growth and stagna-
tion. We also show that frictions that result in misallocation of resources
in the human capital investment sector can have a large impact on output.
Overall, we ﬁnd that human capital matters.
42M o d e l
The model uses the same technology as in Manuelli and Seshadri (2007).
We view the economy as being populated by overlapping generations of
individuals who live for T periods. The time line is the following: After
birth, say at time t0, an individual remains attached to his parent until he
is I years old (at time t0 + I); at that point he creates his own family and
has, at age B (i.e. at time t0+B),e f(t0+B) children that, at time t0+B+I,
leave the parent’s home to be become independent.
The utility functional of a parent who has h units of human capital, and





e−ρ(a−I)u[c(a,t + a − I)]da + e−α0+α1f(t+B−I) (1)
Z I
0
e−ρ(a+B−I)u[ck(a,t + B − I + a)]da
+e−α0+α1f(t+B−I)e−ρBV k(hk(I),b k,t+ B),
where c(a,t)( ck(a,t)) is consumption of a parent (child) of age a at time t.
The term f(t) denotes the log of the number of children born at time t.
We assume that parents are imperfectly altruistic: The contribution
to the parent’s utility of a unit of utility allocated to an a year old child
attached to him is e−α0+α1f(t+B−I)e−ρ(a+B−I), since at that time the parent
is a+B years old. In this formulation, e−α0+α1f(t+B−I) captures the degree
of altruism. If α0 =0 , and α1 =1 , the preference structure is similar
to that in the inﬁnitively-lived agent model. Positive values of α0,a n d
values of α1 less than 1 capture the degree of imperfect altruism. The term
V k(hk(I),b k,t+B) stands for the utility of the child at the time he becomes
independent.
5Each parent maximizes V P(h,b,t) subject to two types of constraints:
the budget constraint, and the production function for human capital. The























t r(s)dsxk(a,t + B − I + a)da +
ef(t+B−I)e−
U t+B














t r(s)ds[w(t + a + B − I)
hk(a,t + B − I + a)(1 − nk(a,t + B − I + a))]da + b.
Since we are interested in understanding transition eﬀects, we allow the
interest rate and the wage rate to vary over time.
We adopt Ben-Porath’s (1967) formulation of the human capital produc-
tion technology, augmented with an early childhood period. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that (ignoring the temporal dependence to simplify notation)
˙ h(a)=zh[n(a)h(a)]γ1x(a)γ2 − δhh(a),a ∈ [I,R) (3)
˙ hk(a)=zh[nk(a)hk(a)]γ1xk(a)γ2 − δhhk(a),a ∈ [6,I) (4)
hk(6) = hBxυ
E, (5)
h(I) given, 0 <γ i < 1,γ = γ1 + γ2 < 1,
Even if there is perfect altruism, we assume that when an individual
dies, his human capital dies with him. Thus, the depreciation rate is 100%
6at age T.
If asset transfers are not constrained, the income maximization and util-
ity maximization problems can be solved independently. In this case, it is
optimal for an individual to maximize the present discounted value of net
income. We assume that each agent retires at age R ≤ T. The maximization








t+6 r(s)ds[w(t + a − 6)h(a)(1 − n(a)) − x(a)]da − xE (6)
subject to
˙ h(a)=zh[n(a)h(a)]γ1x(a)γ2 − δhh(a),a ∈ [6,R), (7)
and
h(6) = hE = hBxυ
E (8)
with hB given. Equations (7) and (8) correspond to the standard human
capital accumulation model initially developed by Ben-Porath (1967). This
formulation allows for both market goods, x(a), and a fraction n(a) of the
individual’s human capital, to be inputs in the production of human capital.
Investments in early childhood, which we denote by xE (e.g. medical care,
nutrition and development of learning skills), determine the level of each
individual’s human capital at age 6, h(6),o rhE for short.1 This formulation
captures the idea that nutrition and health care are important determinants
of early levels of human capital, and those inputs are, basically, market
goods.2
1It should be made clear that market goods (x(a) and xE) are produced using the
same technology as the ﬁnal goods production function. Hence the production function
for human capital is more labor intensive than the ﬁnal goods technology.
2It is clear that parents’ time is also important. However, given exogenous fertility, it
7The solution to the problem is such that n(a)=1 ,f o ra ≤ 6+s(t).
Thus, we identify s(t) as years of schooling of the cohort born at time t.
In the stationary case, i.e. r(s)=r and w(s)=w, Manuelli and Seshadri
(2008)) characterize s and h(s +6 ) .
An important property of the solution from the point of view of the
exercise in this paper is the role played by the real wage. Imagine that
technological improvements (or other shocks) results in a higher level of
equilibrium wages. This –given γ2 −υ(1−γ1) > 0 which is satisﬁed in our
speciﬁcation– induces individuals to stay in school longer (i.e. s increases)
and to acquire more human capital per unit of schooling.
In the stationary case, if h(s +6 )is the amount of human capital that













The ﬁrst term on the right hand side can be interpreted as the eﬀect of
changes in the wage rate on the quantity of human capital (years of school-
ing), while the second term captures the impact on the level of human capital
p e ry e a ro fs c h o o l i n g ,am e a s u r eo fquality. Direct calculations (see Manuelli
and Seshadri (2008)) show that the elasticity of quality with respect to the
wage rate is γ2/(1 − γ), which is fairly large in our preferred parameteriza-
tion.3 This result illustrates one of the major implications of the approach
that we take in measuring human capital in this paper: diﬀerences in years
of schooling are not perfect (or even good in some cases) measures of diﬀer-
seems best to ignore this dimension. For a full discussion of the endogneous fertility case
see Manuelli and Seshadri (2009a).
3To be precise, we ﬁnd that γ2 =0 .33,a n dγ =0 .93. Thus the elasticity of the quality
of human capital with respect to wages is 4.71.
8ences in the stock of human capital. Cross-country diﬀerences in the quality
of schooling can be large, and depend on the level of development. If the
human capital production technology is ‘close’ to constant returns, then the
model will predict large cross country diﬀerences in human capital even if
TFP diﬀerences are small.4
It is possible to show that, in the steady state, the interest rate must
satisfy
r = ρ +[ α0 +( 1− α1)f]/B,
which implies that decreases in fertility are associated with lower interest
rates. This has three eﬀects. First, it lowers the cost of capital inducing in-
creases in the capital-human capital ratio which, in general, results in higher
levels of output per worker. Second, it lowers the opportunity cost of staying
in school. As a result, individuals choose to invest more in schooling and to
allocate more resources to on the job training. This implies that the eﬀec-
tive amount of human capital in the economy increases. Finally, negative
fertility shocks have an impact on the age structure of the population. The
relevant eﬀect is that the fraction of high human capital individuals –i.e.
those in the peak earning years– increases and this, in turn, contributes to
an overall increase in the amount of eﬀective labor available in the economy
The last shock that we study is a change in the (relative) price of capital.
In the steady state, the condition that pins down the capital-human capital
ratio requires that the cost of capital equal its marginal product. In symbols,
this corresponds to
pk(t)[r(t)+δk]=z(t)Fk(κ(t),1), (9)
4It can be shown that the elasticity of quality with respect to TFP is γ2/[(1−θ)(1−γ)],
where θ is capital share.
9where κ(t) is the physical capital - human capital ratio. Thus, a decrease
in the price of capital has a direct impact on the physical capital - human
capital ratio. This, in turn, increases the wage rate per unit of human
capital and induces more investment in human capital. Even though during
the transition the interest rate can respond to the changes in price of capital,
in the steady state it is pinned down by demographic factors and, as such,
does not add to the eﬀect of pk
2.1 Equilibrium
Given the interest rate, standard proﬁt maximization pins down the equilib-
rium capital-human capital ratio. However to determine output per worker,
it is necessary to compute ‘average’ human capital in the economy. Since we
are dealing with ﬁnite lifetimes –and full depreciation of human capital–
there is no aggregate version of the law of motion of human capital since
the amount of human capital supplied to the market depends on an individ-
ual’s age (see the expressions in the Appendix). Thus, to compute average
‘eﬀective’ human capital we need to determine the age structure of the pop-
ulation.
Demographics We assume that, at time t,e a c hB year old individual has
ef(t) children at age B. Thus, the total mass of individuals of age a at time
t satisﬁes
N(a;t)=ef(t−a)N(B;t − a),
N(t0,t)=0 ,t 0 >T.
If the economy converges to a steady state (as we assume), the birth rate,






1 − e−ηT , (11)
and η = f/B is the (long run) growth rate of population.
Aggregation To compute total output it is necessary to estimate the
aggregate amount of human capital eﬀectively supplied to the market, and





This formulation shows that, even if R –the retirement age– is constant,
changes in the fertility rate can have an impact on the average stock of
human capital.
Equilibrium Optimization on the part of ﬁrms implies that
pk(r(t)+δk)=z(t)Fk(κ(t),1), (12)
where κ(t) is the physical capital - human capital ratio. The wage rate per





[c(a,t)+x(a,t)]dN(a;t)+ ˙ K(t) ≤ [z(t)Fh(κ(t),1) − δk]He(t),
where, given the speciﬁcation of age, it is no longer necessary to distinguish
between parent and children variables.
113C a l i b r a t i o n
We use standard functional forms. The production function is assumed to
be Cobb-Douglas
F(k,h)=zkθh1−θ,





Our calibration strategy involves choosing the parameters so that the
steady state implications of the model economy presented above are consis-
tent with observations for the United States (circa 2000). When we apply
the model to the study of other economies the only technological parameter
that we vary is z, which we identify as TFP.
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), the depreciation rate is set at
δk = .06. We set σ =3 . Not much information is available on the fraction
of job training expenditures that are not reﬂected in wages. There are
several reasons why earnings ought not to be equated with wh(1 − n) − x.
First, some part of the training is oﬀ the job and directly paid for by the
individual. Second, ﬁrms typically obtain a tax break on the expenditures
incurred on training. Consequently, the government (and indirectly, the
individual through higher taxes) pays for the training and this component
is not reﬂected in wages. Third, some of the training may be ﬁrm speciﬁc,
in which case the employer is likely to bear the cost of the training, since the
employer beneﬁts more than the individual does through the incidence of
such training. Finally, there is probably some smoothing of wage receipts in
the data and consequently, the individual’s marginal productivity proﬁle is
likely to be steeper than the individual’s wage proﬁle. For all these reasons,
12we set π =0 .5.5 We also assume that the same fraction π is not measured
in GDP.




matters for all the moments of interest. Consequently, we can choose z,
pk (which determine w)a n dhB arbitrarily and calibrate zh to match a
desired moment. The calibrated values of zh and hB are common to all
countries. Thus, the model does not assume any cross-country diﬀerences
in an individual’s ‘ability to learn,’ or initial endowment of human capital.
We set B =2 5 , R =m i n {64,T} and a fertility rate of 2.1. We also assume
that ρ =0 .04. This leaves us with 9 parameters, θ,r,δh,z h,γ1,γ2,υ ,α 0 and
α1. The moments we seek in order to pin down these parameters are:
1. Capital’s share of income of 0.33. Source: NIPA
2. Capital output ratio of 2.52. Source: NIPA
3. Earnings at age R/Earnings at age 55 of 0.8. Source: SSA
4. Earnings at age 50/Earnings at age 25 of 2.17. Source: SSA
5. Years of schooling of 12.08. Source: Barro and Lee
6. Schooling expenditures as a fraction of GDP of 3.77. Source: OECD,
Education at a Glance.
7. Pre-primary expenditures per pupil relative to GDP per capita of 0.14.
Source: OECD, Education at a Glance.
8. Interest rate of 7%.
5If we were to take the view that π =1 , our estimate of the returns to scale, γ = γ1+γ2
increases to 0.96 thereby further increasing the elasticity of output with respect to TFP.
In a sense, choosing π =0 .5 understates our case.
139. Lifetime Intergenerational Transfers/GDP of 4.5%. Gale and Scholz,
1994
The previous equations correspond to moments of the model when eval-
uated at the steady state. This, calibration requires us to solve a system of
9 equations in 9 unknowns. The resulting parameter values are
Parameter θ r δh zh γ1 γ2 ν α0 α1
Value 0.315 0.07 0.018 0.361 0.63 0.3 0.55 0.728 0.55
4 Fast Growers: East Asia
In this section (mostly drawn from Manuelli and Seshadri (2009b)) we use
the model to get a sense of the role that TFP and demographic change
had in accounting for the economic performance of some of the fast growing
countries in East Asia. We study the economic performance of Hong Kong,
Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan, as well as a synthetic “average” of
those economies. In this ﬁrst (preliminary) stage we concentrate on steady
states. Speciﬁcally, we pick TFP in 1960 and 2000 so that the model’s
implications for output per worker for each of the countries coincide with
the data. In comparing 1960 and 2000, we let the structure of the population
change according to the experience of each country.
Since, we want to understand the role of TFP, we report the change in
“true” productivity (labeled z) as well as an alternative measure, which we
denote “Measured TFP” (and we label ˆ z)t h a td i ﬀers from the true measure
by the way that human capital is computed. To be precise, deﬁne –in the
14context of this paper– the “Mincerian” stock of human capital, hm, by
hm(t)=hm
0 eφs(t),
where φ is often associated with the return to education as estimated in a
Mincer regression. For this calculation we chose φ =0 .10, but the results
are very similar for slightly higher and lower values. We take s to the the
average years of schooling of the individuals in the work force. Finally,
“Measured TFP” is the productivity measure that one would recover had
one used the Mincerian measure of human capital without adjusting for on
the job training and quality changes (i.e. changes in h(6+s) and the impact
of on-the-job training).
The results from this experiment are in Table 1
Table 1: East Asia
∆(Y/L) Years of Schooling ∆(I/Y) ∆(z) ∆(ˆ z)
Data Data Model Data Model Model Model
Country 1960 2000 1960 2000
Sing. 6.6 3.14 8.12 3.21 8.66 1.65 1.77 1.15 2.02
H.K. 9.09 4.74 9.47 4.36 8.87 0.89 1.74 1.20 2.62
Mal. 4.49 2.34 7.88 3.08 6.26 1.62 1.53 1.13 1.88
Taiwan 10.14 3.32 8.53 2.52 7.85 1.68 1.64 1.22 2.63
Korea 8.05 3.23 10.46 2.87 8.87 2.67 2.01 1.17 2.08
The model is relatively successful in the sense that associated with the re-
quired change in TFP, it predicts substantial increases in the level of school-
ing in all four countries. In this open economy experiment, changes in de-
mographic structure aﬀect the interest rate, and this results in a predicted
15increase in the investment-output ratio that comes very close –with one
exception– to the evidence. The model, however fails to reproduce Hong
Kong’s ﬂat investment share of output, which is a puzzle for a variety of
models (see Young (1992)).
The predictions of the model for Measured TFP suggest that produc-
tivity diﬀerences account for a good share of the increase in output per
worker, typically around 40%. Our measures of TFP (z) show much smaller
variation and, directly, account for about 8% of the change in output per
worker.
Overall, and ignoring dynamics, it seems that the simple model that we
have speciﬁed can explain fast growth as a result of changes in demographic
structure and changes in productivity.
In a related paper (Manuelli and Seshadri (2009b)) we have studied more
carefully the dynamics associated with this model. There, we show that if
we calibrate the level of TFP (z) so that the predictions of the model for
output per worker relative to the U.S. matches the average of the East Asian
fast growing countries, then the adjustment path implied by the model is
c o n s i s t e n tw i t hf a s tg r o w t hi nr e s p o nse to a one time productivity shock.
Consider the following experiment: a once and for all TFP shock coupled
with the actual changes in fertility. We pick the size of the TFP shock so
that, in the long run, output per worker displays a 7.7 fold increase (which
corresponds to the average increase in output per worker across the four East
Asian economies that we study). We also subject this artiﬁcial economy to a
demographic shocks that is such that the population growth rate decreases
from 3.83% in 1960 to 1.68% in 2000, which is an average of the years
surrounding the beginning and the end of the period under study.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 1. Output per
16worker displays an S-shaped path, which implies a delayed response of the
growth rate to the shocks. The reason is that it takes time to accumulate
human capital: After the economy is hit with a TFP shock, agents ﬁnd
it optimal to increase their stock of human capital. New cohorts go to
school longer than did their older counterparts. Individuals who are already
working now engage in more on the job training. This implies that the stock
of human capital takes time to respond, and this slows down the transition
to the new steady state. The model is able to capture the rise in schooling,
as well as the dramatic rise in the investment to GDP ratio.



























Figure 1: TFP and Fertility Shocks: Transitional Dynamics
Figure 2 reports the evolution of eﬀective human capital per worker, the
Mincerian level of human capital and measured TFP. For this experiment,
17the increase in TFP induces a decrease in eﬀective human capital. It takes
more than 10 years for he to get back to its pre-shock level. In the mean time,
the increase in output is due to the TFP shock and capital accumulation.

























Figure 2: Fast Growers: Measured TFP, Mincerian and Eﬀective Human
Capital
It is possible to determine (see Manuelli and Seshadri (2009b)) the rela-
tive importance of TFP and demographic shocks in accounting for the large
average increase in output per worker in this synthetic fast grower. For our
base case, approximately 30% of the increase in output per worker is due
to the change in population, 44% to the change in TFP, and the rest to
the interaction between those two shocks. Overall, the results indicate that
transitional dynamics cannot be ruled out as explanations for the growth
18performance of the average East Asian fast grower.
5 Slow Growers: Latin America
To evaluate the implications of the model for Latin America we ﬁrst study
the steady state implications. Thus, we choose TFP in 1960 and 2000 so as
to match output per worker. The results are in Table 2.
Table 2: Latin America
∆(Y/L) Years of Schooling X/Y
Data Data Model Model
Country 1960 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000
Argentina 1.37 4.99 8.49 4.32 6.52 2.1 3.6
Brazil 2.61 2.83 4.56 2.42 3.74 2.3 3.1
Chile 2.14 4.99 7.89 3.87 6.11 2.3 3.5
Colombia 1.39 2.97 5.01 3.11 3.92 2.4 2.9
Costa Rica 1.31 3.86 6.01 3.24 4.86 2.8 3.2
Ecuador 1.78 2.95 6.52 2.69 4.73 1.9 2.6
Mexico 1.84 2.41 6.73 2.43 5.12 2.0 3.5
Paraguay 1.42 3.35 5.74 3.51 4.01 2.0 2.7
Peru 1.00 3.02 7.33 2.94 3.07 2.1 2.1
Uruguay 1.46 5.03 7.25 5.27 7.02 3.0 3.4
Venezuela 0.70 2.53 5.61 2.31 1.43 2.5 2.2
The success of the private education model at replicating years of school-
ing (the appropriate test since we are matching output per worker) is, at best
mixed. In general, the predictions for 1960 are reasonably close. However,
as a general rule, the model underpredicts schooling in 2000. In the case of
19economies that have been subject to large shocks (Peru and Venezuela in
this group) the distance between the average years of education in the labor
f o r c ea n dt h ep r e d i c t i o n so ft h em o d e li sm o r et h a nt w i c et h el e v e li m p l i e d
by the model.
Even in countries that have performed reasonably well (e.g. Brazil and
Chile), the model underpredicts schooling levels 20% lower than those ob-
served in 2000. In addition, the model predicts that the share of educational
expenditures in output is signiﬁcantly lower than the observed values. Thus,
our results can be interpreted as supporting the view (e.g. Cole et. al.
(2005)) that human capital is not a key determinant of economic perfor-
mance in the region. It is left to TFP to account for changes in output.
In what follows we will present more detailed results for three countries:
Argentina, Brazil and Chile. For this subset of countries, the model implies
a slight increase in investment ratios (measured in domestic prices) which is
consistent with the Argentine experience but misses both the Brazilian and
the Chilean observations.
Table 3: Population Growth Rates and ∆(I/Y)
Growth Rate ∆(I/Y)
Country 1960 2000 Model Data
Argentina 1.71 1.15 1.02 1.03
Brazil 2.91 1.49 1.05 .94
Chile 2.44 1.37 1.04 .90
Source: Population growth rates from GLOBALIS
5.1 Adding Heterogeneity
In order to better ascertain the role of education and the impact of the
allocation of resources within the educational sector, we studied an extended
20model that allows for heterogeneity across agents. We assume that each
dynasty is characterized by an ability to learn parameter, zh.E v e n w i t h
complete markets, diﬀerences zh result in diﬀerences in asset holdings at a
given point in the lifetime of an individual.
To determine the quantitative eﬀect of adding heterogeneity and the po-
tential for misallocating resources, we need to estimate the distribution of
abilities in the population. Since we view diﬀerences in zh as independent of
economic status and nationality, we use U.S. data to calibrate the distribu-
tion. To be precise, we studied a version of the model with no distortions and
chose the distribution of skills so that the predictions of the model match,
for the year 2000, the observed distribution of schooling.6 We assume that
this distribution remains constant over time and across countries. Once we
introduce heterogeneity, it is necessary to recalibrate the model. As before,
we choose parameters to match U.S. data which in addition to the moments
described earlier include 9 more levels of schooling. (Essentially we compute
the average years of schooling for each decile based on data from NLSY).
We continue to pin down the parameters of the human capital production
function using the earnings proﬁle of the average American (using the So-
cial Security Administration data). Consequently, the estimated parameters
of the human capital production function are the same (since we match the
same interest rate) as before. However, the demand for physical capital does
not equal the supply at the very same preference parameters. Consequently
we adjust α0 and α1 so that the demand for capital equals supply. The new
6As a minimal quality control check, we used these estimates to create artiﬁcial age-
earnings proﬁles for the U.S and used those, in turn, to estimate the implications of the
artiﬁcial economy for the coeﬃcients of the Mincer regression. The articial data are very
succesful at generating predictions that come very close to the available estimates.
21parameter values are α0 =0 .739 and α1 =0 .79. In addition we also have 9
more values for zh that correspond to 9 additional schooling levels.
As before, we concentrate on the steady state implications of the model
and we restrict attention to Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The experiment we
conduct is the analog of the analysis in the previous section: we pick TFP
so that, given the observed demographic structure, the models predictions
agree with the observations of output per worker in each country relative to
the U.S. The results are in Table 4.
Table 4: Private Education: Selected Countries
Schooling x/y ∆z ∆ˆ z
Data Model Data Model
Country 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000
Argentina 4.99 8.49 4.59 6.72 2.5 4.5 2.2 3.7 1.04 1.11
Brazil 2.83 4.56 2.57 3.49 3.0 5.1 2.5 3.2 1.11 1.76
Chile 4.99 7.89 3.58 6.47 2.8 4.6 2.4 3.6 1.10 1.67
Bringing in heterogeneity does not signiﬁcantly change the predictions
for 1960. As in the case of homogeneous agents, this version underpredicts
the level of schooling of the Chilean workforce in 1960. For the more recent
period, this more general model produces slightly higher estimates of school-
ing for Brazil and Chile, and slightly lower for Argentina. The message is
unchanged: relative to its performance, the three countries had too much
education. According to the model the “excess schooling” ranges from over
one year in Brazil to over 1.8 years in Argentina. The “excess education”
(measured as the ratio of actual to predicted level of schooling) is about 26%.
An implication of this excess schooling is that the model underpredicts the
22amount spent on education in 2000.
As expected, actual TFP changes (∆z) are relatively modest, but our
approximation to conventionally measured TFP tells a diﬀerent story: in
both the relatively successful countries (Brazil and Chile), the model requires
large increases in conventional TFP to account for the evidence on output
per worker. On the other hand, measured TFP growth is very small in slow
growing Argentina.
5.2 Educational and Early Childhood Policies
A major conclusion of the previous section is that increases in schooling
have had relatively large payoﬀs in the fast growing countries of East Asia,
but have produced meager returns in Latin America. This section describes
a version of the model in which education is publicly provided (and free).
Our approach is related to Erosa et. al. (2007) with two major diﬀerences:
We retain the same Ben-Porath technology as in the private (or eﬃcient)
education case and we still allow for (privately ﬁnanced) post-schooling in-
vestments in human capital.7
There are two reasons why a public education system can possibly ac-
count for the low eﬀective return to education: it may allocate resources in-
eﬃciently across individuals of diﬀerent ability, or it may allocate resources
ineﬃciently across schooling levels.
In the ﬁrst case, eﬃciency requires that high ability individuals be as-
signed to better schools. In the second case, it is possible to derive the
implications of the model for the (privately) optimal amount of resources
across schooling levels and compare that with the evidence. After we dis-
7Erosa et. al. (2007) also consider stochastic ability (across generations) and mortality
risks; two features that we ignore.
23cuss some theoretical considerations associated with public education, we
analyze the impact of alternative allocation of resources
5.2.1 Basic Model
In this section we study the eﬀects that changes in the quality of publicly
provided schooling and in the cost of early childhood capital have on eco-
nomic performance. We consider the same basic Ben-Porath model except
that, during the schooling period, we assume that market inputs are pub-
licly provided. As a ﬁrst pass, we incorporate diﬀerent degrees of ﬁnancial
market imperfections.
The representative agent solves the following problem




e−r(a−6−s)[wh(a)(1 − n(a)) − x(a)]da],
=m a x
xe,s [−(1 + τe)xe + e−r(6+s)V (h(6 + s),s)],
where V (h(6 + s),s) i st h ep r e s e n td i s c o u n t e dv a l u eo fn e tl a b o ri n c o m ei n
the post-schooling period. The constraints on the problem are
˙ h(a)=zhh(a)γ1x
γ2
G ,a ∈ [6,s+6 ) ,h (6) = hE,
hE = h(6) = zexυ
e.
The ﬁrst equation is just the natural extension of the Ben-Porath technology
to the public education case. In this context, xG is the amount of resources
per student. The second, as before, captures the link between resources
allocated to early childhood human capital and the level of that capital at
age 6 –the beginning of the schooling period. The term (1 + τe) captures
all the distortions that can potentially reduce the amount of early childhood
24human capital. This wedge is intended to capture, in a simple way, all
the factors that can eﬀectively reduce the equilibrium level of childhood
human capital. An example of a policy that could be captured with that
speciﬁcation is any change in the ease with which parents have access to
publicly provided health care. If there is a private component (e.g. time
and travel costs) policies that make access more diﬃcult can, as a ﬁrst pass,
be captured by increases in τe.
The relevant ﬁrst order conditions are
































Simple calculations show that human capital as a function of age (during
the schooling period) is given by
h(a)=[ h(6)1−γ1 +( 1− γ1)zhx
γ2
G (a − 6)]
1
1−γ1 ,a ∈ [6,s+6 ) ,
and that the shadow price of capital evolves according to
q(a)=
Der(a−6)
[h(6)1−γ1 +( 1− γ1)zhx
γ2
G (a − 6)]
1
1−γ1
,a ∈ [6,s+6 ) ,
where D is a constant to be determined.
25Computation of ∂V/∂s requires knowledge of the equilibrium path of
human capital in the post-schooling period. The formulas in Manuelli and
Seshadri (2008) imply that the optimal choice of schooling satisﬁes
q(6 + s)zhh(6 + s)γ1x
γ2






























Putting together all the conditions, a system of two equations suﬃce to
determine the two unknowns D and s.
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r + δ − δm(6 + s)
where
m(6 + s)=1− e−(r+δ)(R−6−s),
For the solution to be well deﬁned, it is necessary that, after leaving the















(r + δ)Ders ≤ 1.
8This case can easily be handled, but the formulae is diﬀerent.
26It is possible to show that equation (14) deﬁnes a downward sloping locus
in (s,D) space. Let D1(s;τe,x G) be the level of D that satisﬁes the ﬁrst
equation and D2(s;xG) the function associated with the second condition
(i.e. deﬁned by equation (15)). It can be shown that the Di are indeed
functions and that











It also follows that, given our preferred parameterization,
D2(0;xG) >D 1(0;τe,x G).
This inequality is more likely to be satisﬁed the higher is the basic wage
rate, w, and the higher are expenditures per student, xG. At our preferred
values, the inequality holds [details missing].
We can show (details are in the Appendix) that D1 and D2 are down-
ward sloping (as a function of s) and that D1 intersects D2 from below. In
this case, the solution is unique, and it is such that increases in the cost
of acquiring early childhood capital (τe) will result in increases in school-
ing. The eﬀect of xG on the equilibrium level of schooling is theoretically
ambiguous but, for our parameter values, increases in the quality of public
education increase schooling.
The model can easily be extended to the case in which diﬀerent levels of
schooling are allocated diﬀerential levels of resources. Let xi,i∈ {P,S,T}
be the level of expenditure per student in primary, secondary and tertiary
education. Let si be the length (in years) of each schooling level. Then, the
27human capital of a student with s years of schooling is
h(6 + s)=[ h(6)1−γ1 +( 1− γ1)zh¯ xE(s)]
1
1−γ1 ,
where ¯ xE(s) is a measure of the amount of eﬀective resources available to a
student with s y e a r so fs c h o o l i n g ,a n di ti sg i v e nb y
¯ xE(s)
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
x
γ2
P s 0 ≤ s ≤ sP
x
γ2
P sP + x
γ2
S (s − sP) sP ≤ s ≤ sP + sS
x
γ2
P sP + x
γ2
S sP + x
γ2
T (s − sS − sP) sP + sS ≤ s
.
The optimal choice of schooling and early childhood human capital satisfy
the analog of conditions (14) and (15). We do not present the details here.
5.2.2 Quantitative Results
Throughout this section we study the version of the model with heterogene-
i t yi na b i l i t y .
Public Education with Eﬃcient Capital Markets Since public edu-
cation plays such a large role in Latin America, our ﬁrst experiment intro-
duces public schools an assumes that resources, across schooling levels are
allocated in accordance with the observations.9 The public educational sys-
tem is ﬁnanced through taxes on capital and labor. In addition to picking
TFP to match output per worker, we choose taxes so that revenue could
ﬁnance a total level of expenditures equal to the sum of educational ex-
penditures and a non-educational component that we set equal to 20% of
output.
9Public education is also very important in the U.S. However, the fact that local ﬁ-
nancing comprises a large fraction of educational expenditures makes it more likely, using
Tybout like arguments, that the allocation of resources in the U.S. resemble the privately
optimal distribution.
28Unlike the private education case, educational expenditures are exoge-
nous in this case. To determine the appropriate values we use data on
relative expenditures per student at diﬀerent schooling level. The following
table presents the data that we used.
Table 5: Relative Expenditures per Student
xS/xP xT/xP
Country 1960 2000 1960 2000
Argentina 1.46 1.46 3.53 3.53
Brazil 4 1.14 11 13.9
Chile 1.93 1.1 4.74 4.0
Source: UNESCO (****)10
All three countries show signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amount of resources
allocated to the three levels. Brazil funds its tertiary sector at much higher
levels than Argentina or Chile. As a reference, the relevant ratios for the
U.S. are 1.32 and 2.20 in the year 2000. This suggests that the three Latin
American countries that we are studying might be overinvesting in higher
education.
To complete the calibration of the model, we chose the level of expen-
ditures in primary schooling both in 1960 and 2000 so the implications of
the model match the data for the share of educational expenditures in GDP.
Thus, in this exercise, the free variable is years of schooling. The results of
the experiment are in Table 6.
10We could not ﬁnd data for Argentina in 1960 and we assume that the ratios are the
same as in 2000. For Chile, our 1960 ratios correspond to 1970.
29Table 6: Public Education
Schooling x/y (in %) ∆z ∆ˆ z
Data Model Data=Model
Country 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000
Argentina 4.99 8.49 5.07 7.83 2.5 4.5 1.05 1.08
Brazil 2.83 4.56 2.89 4.15 3.0 5.0 1.13 1.65
Chile 4.99 7.89 4.34 6.65 2.8 4.6 1.12 1.54
Bringing in public education helps to partially solve the “education puz-
zle.” The predictions for 1960 are much closer to the data (the model still
underpredicts Chile), and the diﬀerence between the data and the predic-
tions of the model for 2000 are signiﬁcantly smaller. Even though, according
to our model the three countries have overinvested in education, the excess
years of schooling now range from 0.4 years in Brazil to 1.25 years in Chile.
In relative terms, the private education economy underpredicted actual years
of schooling by 26%, while the public education economy misses by less than
half of that percentage, 12%.
The results suggest that the relatively low payoﬀ associated with the
observed increase in average years of schooling in Latin America may be
due to a combination of two factors. Thus, the two potential sources of
misallocation can partially explain the ineﬃciency of education in these three
countries. In addition to this eﬀect, increases in the educational budget have
to be ﬁnanced with distortionary taxes. This, in turn, lowers the payoﬀ from
additional schooling.
As before, relatively modest increases in productivity appear (except in
Argentina) as large increases in measured TFP.
To ascertain the impact that reallocating educational resources could
30have on output we conducted the two experiments. First, holding the share
of educational expenditures to output constant, we eliminated all funding
to the tertiary level, and the freed up resources were reallocated to primary
education. We ﬁnd that this reallocation has a large eﬀect of output per
worker. In the year 2000, it results in 12% increase in output per worker in
Argentina (in the long run), a 19% increase in Brazil and a 17% increase in
Chile.11
The second experiment holds constant the amount of resources devoted
to the tertiary level and reallocates them to primary schooling. In this case
we ﬁnd that the impact on output per worker is smaller but still sizeable:
4% in Argentina, 9% increase in Brazil, and 5% increase in Chile.12Thus, the
long run eﬀect of the composition of educational expenditures has a large
impact on output. We are now currently studying the optimal allocation.
Public and Private Education with Borrowing Constraints So far
we have imposed no restrictions on borrowing. However, one of the jus-
tiﬁcations for publicly ﬁnanced education is that due to ﬁnancial market
imperfections, some individuals would be forced to underinvest in educa-
t i o n . I ft h i si st h ec a s e ,a n ym i s a l l o c ation of educational resources has an
even larger impact on output.
As a ﬁrst step we seek to understand the interaction between borrowing
constraints and TFP we modify the previous setup in two ways. First,
dynasties are required to hold at all times a nonnegative level of assets.
11Since the diﬀerences were much larger in 1960, we ﬁnd that the gains could have been
much larger as well. For Argentina the potential increase was 22%, for Brazil we estimate
it to be 46% and for Chile the increase is 43%.
12Since the absolute levels were much lower in 1960, the gains in this case are smaller.
The corresponding values are: 1.2% in Argentina, 0.8% in Brazil, and 0.6% in Chile.
31Second, we allow individuals to supplement the (freely) provided public
educational resources with private expenditures. Thus, we allow for private
education13. We assume that dynasties cannot borrow. Since there are
many steady states depending on the initial level of assets, we study the long
run distribution associated with an initial condition in which all individuals
have an equal share of a (small) level of capital. This determines a joint
distribution of ability and assets in the long run.
The results corresponding to this speciﬁcation are in Table 7.
Table 7: Borrowing Constrained Economy
Schooling x/y (in %) ∆z ∆ˆ z
Data Model Data-public Model-total
Country 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000 1960 2000
Argentina 4.99 8.49 4.78 8.40 2.3 3.6 2.5 4.5 1.03 1.06
Brazil 2.83 4.56 2.82 4.61 2.8 4.0 2.9 4.9 1.1 1.53
Chile 4.99 7.89 4.38 7.66 2.7 4.0 2.8 4.5 1.09 1.41
The remarkable ﬁnding is that, with the added friction, the model comes
very close to perfectly predicting schooling in both periods for all three
countries. Years of schooling are close to the evidence and the share of
private resources allocated to education appears close to the evidence in the
case of Argentina and Brazil (1% of GDP), but a little low in the case of
Chile (0.5% of GDP). Even though our results are extremely preliminary
and ignore other forms of allocative ineﬃciency, we are led to conclude that
a simple variant of the neoclassical model can account for the “education
13We have not imposed the non-convexity associated with sending a child to a public or
a private school. At this point, private education complements publicr e s o u r c e s .W ep l a n
to look at the more realistic case in future research.
32puzzle.” Thus, limited access to schools, and allocative ineﬃciencies seem to
account for the low impact of the increase in schooling. As before measured
TFP increases substantially in Brazil and Chile (much less in Argentina),
while true productivity does not change much.
In this version of the model, measured TFP (ˆ z) accounts for about 45% of
the increase in output in Brazil and Chile, and close to 20% in Argentina. On
the other hand, actual TFP’s share hovers around 10%. Not surprisingly, the
empirical multiplier eﬀect of productivity in the distorted Latin American
economies is smaller than in the East Asian countries.
As a test of the model we report the implications for the Gini coeﬃ-
cient and the fraction of the population with zero schooling. The income
inequality measures are a little lower than the available evidence but that is
to be expected since our model includes no shocks and hence it will tend to
underestimate income dispersion.
Table 8: Inequality
Gini No Schooling (%)
Model Model
Country 1960 2000 1960 2000
Argentina 0.36 0.39 22% 8%
Brazil 0.42 0.47 48% 18%
Chile 0.39 0.44 27% 13%
We do not (at this point) have evidence on the fraction of the population
with no schooling and, hence, we cannot evaluate the predictions of the
model. However, if one uses the illiteracy rate as a measure of no schooling,
the model seems to overpredict the level, although it does a much better job
of forecasting relative levels (e.g. Brazil’s illiteracy rate in 1960 was much
33higher than Argentina’s or Chile’s).
As in the case of perfect capital markets, we studied the output gains
associated with redistributing resources. Holding the share of educational
expenditures constant, the policy that redistributes public educational re-
sources from higher education to primary schooling has a much larger eﬀect:
In Argentina it is predicted that it increases output (in the long run) by 28%,
while in Brazil the comparable number is 56%. The reason for this much
larger impact is that with imperfect capital markets some high skilled stu-
dents do not have access to higher education due to lack of resources. In
that case, redistribution toward primary schooling has the impact of pro-
viding more resources to some high skill individuals –with a large payoﬀ
in terms of human capital– that do not go to college because of ﬁnancial
constraints.
6 Concluding Comments
We ﬁnd that a model in which educational resources are allocated eﬃciently
can account for the fast growth episodes that characterized some East Asian
countries. However, the same model creates an “education puzzle” when
applied to Latin American countries: Relative to the model (that matches
by design the changes in output per worker), Latin American countries have
“too much” education.
We show that ineﬃciently provided public education and imperfect cap-
ital markets –that, eﬀectively, prevent able individuals from acquiring the
optimal amount of education– can result in “low quality” schooling from
a macroeconomic perspective. Simple calculations suggest large potential
gains from reallocating resources across educational levels.
347 Appendix
In this appendix we discuss the property of the equilibrium with public
education. Let,










Thus, D1(0;τe,x G) is independent of xG and it has a wage elasticity equal


































r + δ − δm(6 + s)
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Since D2(0;xG) is increasing in xG, it follows that higher expenditures make
































(which is satisﬁed in our calibrated experiment) then D2(0;xG) >D 1(0;τe,x G).
We next argue that for s close to R−6,D 2(s;xG) <D 1(s;τe,x G). Actually
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since ˆ m(R − 6) = 0. Thus, even though both D1 and D2 converge to
0a ss goes to R − 6, the convergence of D2 is faster and, hence, for s
near R − 6,D 2(s;xG) <D 1(s;τe,x G). Since, given our parameter values
D2(0;xG) >D 1(0;τe,x G), and since the functions are continuous, this es-
tablishes the existence of a solution. Moreover, it shows that there is at
least one solution, such that D2(s;xG) intersects D1(s;τe,x G) from above.
Since both functions are downward sloping and ∂D1(s;τe,x G)/∂τe < 0, this
implies that increases in τe increase schooling, even though human capital
decreases. Finally, this is a concave programming problem and, as such, it
has a unique solution.
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